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The Role of Public Services in State- and Nation-Building: 
Exploring Lessons from European History for Fragile States 
 
 
Abstract  
 
Concerns about failed and fragile states have put state- and nation-building firmly on 
the academic and policy agenda. The crucial role of public services in this process 
has remained under-explored. The 1960s and 70s generated a substantial set of 
literature on state- and nation-building that is largely absent from current writings that 
focus on developing countries. This literature, mainly focusing on Western European 
countries, identified state penetration, standardisation, and accommodation as key 
processes in the state- and nation-building sequence. In this paper we analyse these 
processes of state- and nation-building in Western Europe in the 17th-19th centuries, 
and the role of public services therein, to explore how they may help us to 
understand the success and failure of state- and nation-building in developing 
countries and fragile states. We end with a number of key lessons and questions for 
international donors. 
 
Keywords: state-building, service delivery, service provision, nation-building 
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A renewed interest in state- and nation-building 
 
Any cursory review of recent publications in the fields of development, politics or 
international relations will confirm that ‘state-building’ is currently experiencing a 
renaissance of interest (Berger & Weber, 2006; Dobbins et al., 2003; Etzioni, 2004; 
Fukuyama, 2004; Hopp, 2004; Lister & Wilder, 2005; Ottaway, 2002; Rondinelli & 
Montgomery, 2005; Šelo Šabić, 2005). It is the primary topic of several recent books, 
journal symposia and research initiatives, with an even larger literature that relates 
implicitly to the topic. 
 
This renewed interest follows shifts in the literature and in practice in the 1990s 
towards a ‘rediscovery’ of the role of institutions and the state for development and 
democracy (Evans, Rueshemeyer, & Skocpol, 1999; North, 1990) after a decade of 
focusing on reducing the role of state and unleashing the market (Fukuyama, 2004). 
Effective institutions came to be seen as prerequisites for building a functioning 
democracy (Wang, 2003), and good governance made its entry in the development 
discourse.  Recent examples of state fragility have emphasised the importance of 
public institutions for development (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002; Brinkerhoff, 
2005). 
 
Despite the explosion in size of the literature on state-building, very little research 
explicitly addresses the question of what role public service provision can play in 
state-building ventures (Waldman, 2007). Much of the attention has gone to the 
political dimensions of state- and nation-building (democratisation, elections, etc.) 
(Wang, 2003), with notable exceptions such as Fukuyama’s (2004) book on state-
building. Most of the published material available on services and state-building 
focuses on centralised activities rather than state-building at the decentralised or 
local level. It also focuses on the ‘how’ of delivering services in weak or fragile 
contexts, for example strategies for coping with weak infrastructure, handling spoilers 
or dealing with ethnically divided societies. Less attention is paid to ‘why’ public 
service provision should be included in state-building interventions, the unspoken 
assumption often being that effective public services are a good in themselves and 
therefore service delivery goals in fragile states are legitimate ends in themselves 
(Waldman, 2007). Most of the available literature omits to discuss the political 
impacts of state provision of services on governance, state capacity and legitimacy. 
Whilst the majority of authors emphasise a rosy picture, where service delivery has 
the potential to reduce state fragility and build state capacity and legitimacy, an 
alternative view is possible. Questions remain about the robustness of these 
assumptions when state-building interventions are played out in complex, messy 
political environments. The main lesson to learn from the literature is that donors 
should not assume that service provision is an apolitical, non-controversial starting 
point for state-building interventions (Batley, 2004). Instead, as the next section of 
this paper will explore, the delivery of public services is an inherently political issue 
that has been used for political ends throughout history.  
 
The focus of many recent publications on state- and nation-building is limited to a 
number of high-profile examples, such as the reconstruction of the state in post-War 
Germany and Japan, or, more recently, Bosnia. It is true, Germany and Japan “set a 
standard for post-conflict nation-building that has not since been matched” (Dobbins 
et al., 2003: xiii). Yet, much of the traditional literature on state- and nation-building is 
remarkably absent from the current writings that try to shed light on the situation in, 
for example, Iraq or Somalia. During the 1960s and 1970s, scholars devoted 
considerable attention to the processes of state- and nation-building in Western 
Europe in the 17th-19th centuries (Eisenstadt & Rokkan, 1973; Migdal, 2001; Rokkan, 
Urwin, Aarebrot, Malaba, & Sande, 1987; Tilly, 1975a). In Europe, the work of Stein 
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Rokkan was central to the development of new frameworks for analysis (Flora, 
Kuhnle, & Urwin, 1999), and Tilly has broadened our understanding of macro-
historical processes and evolutions (Tilly, 1975a; Tilly, 1992). Much of this literature 
also extended to developing countries because decolonisation had created a need to 
build new nations (Bendix, 1964; Stone, 1965).  
 
In this article, we will rely on a number of key concepts used in this European 
literature on state- and nation-building to reflect on the importance of public services 
in current state- and nation-building. We first show why it is important to specifically 
look at the role of public services in state- and nation-building processes. We then 
illustrate how public services played a role in state- and nation-building in Western 
Europe. More specifically, we will do so by describing three separate processes that 
have been identified by the literature: penetration, standardisation, and 
accommodation. Subsequently, we discuss the implications of these findings for 
current state- and nation-building in developing countries and in fragile states. We 
end by formulating a number of lessons for contemporary state- and nation-builders. 
Before we do so, however, we first need to clarify the meaning and use of the 
concepts state- and nation-building. We do so in the next section. 
 
 7 
State- vs. nation-building 
 
There is much confusion over the terms ‘state-building’ and ‘nation-building’ 
(Goldsmith, 2007; Hippler, 2004). A review of recent academic publications on the 
topic shows that many authors use the terms interchangeably, whilst others use them 
with completely different meanings. Historically, in a Western European context, the 
terms refer to different periods in time. State-building refers processes in 17th and 
18th century Europe, when many of the contemporary states started to consolidate, 
requiring the development of modern bureaucracies (Tilly, 1975a). Nation-building 
mainly refers to 19th century processes further contributing to the psychological 
integration of states. In nation-building, states reached out to the masses, and public 
services have been an important instrument in this. The 19th century saw the 
emergence of conscription, obligatory schooling, as well as an improved 
communications and infrastructure network through new roads, railways, and postal 
services (Weber, 1976). These ‘agencies of change’ (Weber, 1976: 193 e.v.) 
completed the process of state-building, and contributed to the development of a 
nation.  
 
In current development literature, most people use ‘state-building’ to refer to 
interventionist strategies to restore and rebuild the institutions and apparatus of the 
state, for example the bureaucracy. In contrast, ‘nation-building’ also refers to the 
creation of a cultural identity that relates to the particular territory of the state. In 
current approaches to state-building in developing countries and failed states, the 
focus is on making governance effective (Rondinelli & Montgomery, 2005). The 
literature generally neglects the ‘building a cultural identity’ aspects of nation-building, 
choosing instead to focus on the more technical aspects of building state capacity. 
Writers might therefore claim to write about nation-building, but in fact their emphasis 
is really on state-building. 
 
There are historical reasons why external actors engaged in state-building activities 
might be cautious about their choice of terminology. Whilst state-building and nation-
building are often used interchangeably in current debates, they have not always 
been perceived as synonymous. Nation-building was heavily discussed in the 
development literature of the 1950s and 1960s and carried a strong conceptual link 
to modernization theories of development (Dinnen, 2006; Hippler, 2004). During the 
Cold War, the US and the USSR both used ‘nation-building’ as a tactic to limit the 
reach of their enemy. However, by the 1970s the term fell out of favour having been 
linked with the US’ involvement in the Vietnam War. The recent willingness to 
discuss state-building in terms of ‘neo-imperialism’ or ‘neo-colonialism’ (Etzioni, 
2004; Mallaby, 2002; Paris, 2006) has lead parts of the development community to 
distance themselves from this terminology for fear of being accused of ‘neo-
colonialist’ activities.  
 
However, although ‘state-building’ is possibly a less controversial term than ‘nation-
building’ for external actors to use to describe their interventions, there has, in recent 
years, been a tendency for the difference between the two terms to become less 
marked and for them to be used interchangeably by many in the international 
community. This is most common in non-academic circles, particularly in the media, 
donor circles and amongst NGOs. This has probably largely been influenced by the 
Bush administration’s (and, as a result, the media’s) tendency to use the term 
‘nation-building’ for its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, the term 
‘nation-building’ is increasingly being used for activities that could more accurately be 
described as ‘state-building’. 
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A further issue contributing to confusion is that the development community is 
undecided as to the extent to which all development activities can be categorised as 
state- and nation-building (Mallaby, 2002). Many aspects of mainstream development 
activity such as those focusing on good governance or anti-corruption and the 
increasing focus of development policy on politics and the state are actually state-
building activities, albeit not explicitly labelled in that way. In general, development 
experts seem hesitant to adopt the language of state-building. This may be an 
attempt to distance themselves from the modernisation theories of the past and the 
aggressive foreign policies of the present, or it may be in recognition of what an 
extremely large and diverse topic state-building really is; development practitioners 
generally tend to specialise in aspects of building state capacity rather than claiming 
expertise in how to develop all aspects of a nation-state. Hence their tendency is to 
focus on specific aspects, for example service delivery measures, tax reforms, civil 
service reform, infrastructure development, democratisation, political party support, 
public financial management training, civil society support, peace building and 
conflict management, rather than tackle ‘state-building’ as one coherent concept.  
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The role of public services in European nation-building:  
Key processes and implications 
 
Public services are what make the state visible to its citizens. Public services are 
citizens’ direct line to government. They make the state tangible through an almost 
daily interaction, direct or indirect. States are shaped by images and practices 
(Migdal, 2001: 16), and public services contribute to the creation of these images and 
practices. Public services have played a pivotal role in state- and nation-building in 
Western Europe (Barker, 1944). Several processes in 19th century European state- 
and nation-building contributed to this increase in visibility: post offices, town halls, 
police posts, hospitals, schools etc. were built in many localities; people were hired 
and paid as police officers, village teachers, railway station chiefs, town hall clerks 
etc., thereby creating a sense of loyalty and belonging to the state; public 
infrastructure works made the previously far away centres of power more accessible 
(Weber, 1976).  
 
Territorial consolidation is one of the key characteristics of the development of the 
modern state (Finer, 1975: 87). A entirely decentralised approach to public services 
would make the state wither away and make it invisible (Paddison, 1983: 29; Fesler, 
1965). The development of public services was part of a process of nation-building 
through coercion and homogenisation (Tilly, 1975b: 43). Institutions such as 
obligatory schooling or mass conscription contributed to the socialisation of the 
population into the values of the state, while the new physical networks (railways, 
roads) and networked services (post offices) contributed to a physical and mental 
integration of the national territory. Public services carried and diffused the values of 
the new nations. These institutions and networks created a visible distinction 
between ‘in’ and ‘out’ and helped to establish clear territorial boundaries. This 
definition of boundaries also happens through small things such as changes in road 
markings or traffic signs, in the same way that a presence or absence of certain 
commercial ‘brands’ indicates you have left a certain area or country. Public services 
in this way contribute to the bonding between the state and citizens.  
 
Our thinking about the role of public services in state- and nation-building in fragile 
states may benefit from an analysis of processes of state- and nation-building in 
Western Europe. The literature and the conceptual writings of Rokkan and Tilly in 
particular, reveal three main processes that help us to explain how public services 
have played a role in state- and nation-building. These processes are penetration, 
standardisation and accommodation. Public services may contribute to the 
integration of peripheries and to the consolidation of a territory; they may contribute 
to a standardisation thereby facilitating exchange, mobility and equity; and they may 
be used as a tool for power-brokering, pacification, and accommodation. 
 
 
Processes of penetration 
 
Penetration refers to a process of establishing control and establishing the presence, 
authority and visibility of the state or the ruling powers. S. E. Finer defined it as “the 
ability of the government to act directly upon the population by its own agents, 
instead of through intermediate local bigwigs” (Finer, 1999: 1611). The aim of 
penetration is to contribute to the cohesion and legitimacy of the state through a 
process of political and territorial socialisation and, in Max Weber’s words, to 
establish the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” 
(Weber, 1974: 78). Public services are an important instrument in this process of 
‘penetration’ whereby states establish efficient presence in and control of the national 
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territory (Paddison, 1983: 9) and socialise its inhabitants (Newman, 2006; Duchacek, 
1970). In 19th century Europe, this process has been clearly visible through the 
establishment of dispersed public services and the creation of infrastructure 
networks. It is in this period we saw in many states the building of town halls, post 
offices, railway stations etc. The development and modernisation of national 
administrations lead to the creation of a series of deconcentrated offices and 
services. This strengthened the presence of the centre in rural, remote, and 
peripheral areas, or even made it genuinely visible for the first time.  
 
Other examples are the creation of national railway systems in Europe, which ‘froze’ 
the territorial structure of Europe (Flora et al., 1999: 157), or the building of major 
national roads. Eugen Weber referred to road-building in 19th century France as a 
way of linking the centre to the periphery; these roads could effectively be labelled 
“administrative highways” (Weber, 1976: 195), facilitating the movement of troops, 
tax collectors, school inspectors etc. The result, according to Weber, was a “system 
built to serve the government and the cities” that, due to its highly centralised nature 
and resulting lack of a “supporting network of secondary thoroughfares had little to do 
with popular habit or need” (Weber, 1976: 195). The much less centralised transport 
network system in Germany as opposed to the French one reflects the less 
integrated political situation in the area when these networks were established (see 
Paddison, 1983 for a graphic example). 
  
The result of the modernisation of the state and the resulting state penetration, not 
only in 19th century European states, but also in the colonies of these states in the 
mid 20th century, was that, “Even in the most remote parts of a country, states have 
had a huge impact. […] Remote villages have state-financed police, roads, potable 
water, state tax collectors, credit, marketing cooperatives, schools, subsidized 
contraceptives, electricity, health care, and more” (Migdal, 2001: 55). The 
establishment of a field service apparatus greatly facilitated the execution of policies 
and the control over local jurisdictions (Paddison, 1983: 9). 
 
A key process in this penetration is ‘boundary-building’, by which the scope and 
extent of the territory and of the state is clearly demarcated. In its territorial sense, 
boundary-defining is easy to imagine. In its social meaning, the boundary separates 
“the state from other non-state, or private, actors and social forces” (Migdal, 2001: 
17). In a situation with mixed state and non-state provision of public services, and 
especially in situations where geographical boundaries are unclear, disputed, or 
changing, such boundary-building may be difficult (Anderson, 1991: 114), and have 
an adverse effect on penetration capacity, and thus, on state- and nation-building. 
 
These examples show that the process of penetration is not a harmonious and 
uncontested one. It is about establishing control. It is noteworthy to mention that in 
his work on state-building, Charles Tilly has also used the word ‘statemaking’. It 
refers to a coercive process of penetration by attacking, eliminating and neutralising 
internal rivals (Tilly, 1992: 54; Tilly, 1999: 181). This may or may not include the 
introduction of merit-based bureaucracies to curtail the power and privileges of other 
dominant groups in the organisation of public services (Jacoby, 1973: 175). The 
frequent use of the terms ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’ in the state- and nation-building 
literature implies a relation of subordination of the periphery to the centre (Gottmann, 
1980: 17). It requires that the states supersedes or controls alternative sources of 
authority, or sources of authority that are or could become challenges to its 
supremacy. 
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Processes of standardisation 
 
A second key process, different from but related to penetration, in state- and nation-
building is standardisation. Standardisation, as exercised through public services, 
contributed to the creation of a common culture through the presence of similar and 
readily identifiable public services. This standardisation is expressed through similar 
administrative procedures for all citizens; the use of identification documents (Torpey, 
2000); a statistical system for the classification of citizens, groups, and territories 
(Scott, 1998); integrated curricula for schools (Gellner, 1983: 52); networks of post 
offices; uniforms for certain public sector staff; national television (Dhoest, 2007); a 
common architecture for public buildings etc. In many cases encounters between 
citizens and administrations and public institutions such as schools or the army 
(conscription) also contributed to the creation of a common language. Riggs speaks 
in this context about state nationalism (Riggs, 1997: 351), where a state creates a 
nation. Public services diffuse cultural symbols of statehood and nationhood (Shils, 
1975: 39). They are symbols of state presence. Through a process of 
homogenisation (Tilly, 1975a), this standardisation attempts to build a moral unity 
(Wang, 2003). The state, using its services, builds an imagined community 
(Anderson, 1991); it manufactures and nourishes imagery, and it communicates a 
package of ideals (Price, 1995: 46). In this way, public services are part of everyday 
nationalism.  
 
A bureaucracy is a means to control diverging tendencies in autonomous bodies, 
agencies and organisations, and thus to integrate these (Poggi, 1990: 31-2). 
Standardisation may therefore require the annihilation or suppression of alternative 
autonomous power centres or alternative delivery mechanisms (e.g. through local 
strong men) that compete for people’s loyalty and identity (Wang, 2003). This may 
even mean changing, dismantling or neutralising well-functioning service delivery 
mechanisms (Braun, 1975). It may also lead to the suppression of diverging identities 
(the former French centralist approach geared towards the suppression of regional 
languages is a good example). This standardisation aids identification with the state, 
and, by doing so, also attempts to break down identification with alternative 
authorities (such as other states, regional or local interests, or competing leaders). 
The processes of modernisation with which 19th century European state-building is 
associated are characterised by intolerance of diversity (Billig, 1995: 130) and 
“enforced uniformity” (Poggi, 1990: 81). This extends to those employed in public 
services. It is insufficient that someone performs his/her duty in delivering a service. 
He/she also needs to identify with a wider state apparatus and show solidarity and 
connection with fellow public sector workers. Such a process of standardisation is 
probably relatively straightforward in a context of rapid modernisation when many of 
the public services are new rather than replacements of existing ones. 
Standardisation may be much more damaging in a context where efficient alternative 
service delivery mechanisms already exist. 
 
 
Processes of accommodation 
 
A last process we will discuss is that of accommodation. It adds a somewhat less 
coercive aspect to the processes of penetration and standardisation, and may act as 
a counterbalance. Public services may serve as instruments for dispute settlement 
and for the creation of political loyalty. Despite what NPM-style literature may lead us 
to believe, public services and public servants do more than delivering undisputed 
services in a neutral manner.  
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The vast scholarship on the role of politics, political appointments, spoils etc. in 
administrations demonstrates the extent to which the provision of public services and 
of positions within these public services is a key element in political power-brokering 
and accommodation. Accommodation may be a means of “binding critical elements 
of the population to the state” (Migdal, 2001: 77) and may act as a safeguard against 
the development of competing centres of power within the state (Migdal, 2001: 75). 
Public services are in such a case a tool to buy loyalty and to make disloyalty 
expensive. By providing a clear path for social mobility, public sector employment 
has contributed to social harmony and has promoted citizens’ identification with the 
state. 
 
In divided societies, public services may contribute to the maintenance of a delicate 
balance between groups. Public services have had, and still have in the case of 
developing or post-conflict countries, a role in nation- and identity-building and 
pacification (Stillman, 2000: 18; Thompson, 1965: 208). Sharing out public sector 
jobs or a promise to provide certain facilities to certain individuals, groups or regions 
is an excellent instrument to cement political pacts. Such processes of 
accommodation are especially visible in ethnically divided societies where quotas are 
sometimes used in the distribution of public offices (Bangura, 2006). Public 
administration, public institutions and public services may help to resolve cultural 
conflicts between majorities and minorities. Bourgeois speaks in this context of 
“administrative consociationalism” (Bourgeois, 2007: 633), echoing Lijphart’s concept 
which has largely been applied to political structures at the central level (Lijphart, 
1977), rather than to a more decentralised level of public service delivery such as 
schools and local public services. This shows that a distribution of resources in the 
modern state should not just be approached from an equity perspective, but that 
there is also a strong instrumental dimension to redistribution (Wang, 2003). 
 
Accommodation and dispute settlement may require some decisions which may not 
always be well-received and may be criticised for their lack of democratic character. 
These processes of accommodation reveal an interesting paradox in state- and 
nation-building initiatives, especially when these initiatives also aim to promote 
democratisation. Elite pacts, including arrangements on public service delivery, in a 
way attempt to achieve the principles of the modern democratic state by using 
methods that would not generally be associated with such a polity. O’Donnell and 
Schmitter made a similar point when they introduced the concept of elite pacts into 
the political science literature though their study on transitions from authoritarianism 
in Latin America: ‘Ironically, such modern pacts move the polity toward democracy by 
undemocratic means’ (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 38). 
 
Yet, the opposite case, while based on a similar principle, generally attracts much 
less criticism. We have seen several instances where certain groups have been 
removed from administrative and public service positions precisely for their lack of 
loyalty to, or even betrayal of the polity. This tends to happen in times of change and 
times of challenged power. Good examples are the lustration processes in several 
Central- and Eastern-European post -communist societies, especially in 
Czechoslovakia; de-nazification in post WWII Germany; or more recently de-
Baathification in Iraq (David, 2006; Ellis, 1996). Yet, for the sake of completeness it 
needs to be mentioned that public services are less subject to such processes than, 
for example, the military or political bodies. Just as with other acts of 
accommodation, or of standardisation, such lustration processes may also have an 
adverse impact on the ability of public services to deliver, for example because all 
expertise has been weeded out (Dobbins et al., 2003: 13-14). 
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Public services and state- and nation-building:  
Lessons learned  
 
To summarise briefly, this paper has argued that public service delivery is not neutral 
but a highly political matter. We have demonstrated how service provision has been 
used in European history as a state tool for penetration (territorial consolidation and 
the integration of peripheries), for standardisation (homogenisation of the population 
and its experiences) and for accommodation (including pacification, buying loyalty 
and power-brokering). So what does all this mean for international donors keen to 
engage in service provision and state-building interventions in developing countries?  
Is this European experience, and are these European models and processes 
relevant or transferable to a different context?  
 
 
Transferability 
 
Whilst some international development researchers suggest that transferable lessons 
can be gleaned from the European example (Moore, 2004), others strongly assert 
that they cannot (Herbst, 2000). These contrary perspectives seem to centre on the 
question of the similarity of context. The European model grew out of a feudal 
system, and this has been regarded as a reason why ‘[T]he European state-building 
experiences will not repeat themselves in new states’ (Tilly, 1975b: 81). In a feudal 
system, with its dispersed power, suppressing the local power base that could 
challenge the state was relatively easy. Some, for this reason, suggest that Europe 
may have been the special case in history, rather than the model (Herbst, 2000). 
Another significant difference between European state-building and current state-
building processes in developing countries is the involvement of many external and 
international actors in the latter, including multi- and bi-lateral donors, NGOs and 
private institutions, each with their own practices and political agendas (Zaum, 2007).  
 
At the same time, Tilly (1985) emphasises the similarity between the political 
contexts of Europe in the 16th and 17th century and of many countries in the modern 
developing world, arguing that both are dominated by coercive, self-seeking, violent 
rulers.  
 
So, given that there are significant differences and similarities between the contexts, 
can any lessons be learned?  This article takes a middle ground. We do not propose 
that lessons from European history can be lifted directly and applied unquestioningly 
to the diverse contexts of developing countries where state-building ventures are 
taking place. However, we do propose that there are some broad principles that we 
can take from a backward glance at history to inform current and future practice. 
Learning about the European examples may facilitate analysis of the situation in 
other countries (Flora et al., 1999; Rokkan, 1975). 
 
 
Donors and penetration, standardisation and accommodation 
 
State governments in fragile environments often have weak or no control over large 
sections of their territory (Herbst, 2000: 19; Lister & Wilder, 2005). Governance in 
these areas can alternatively be provided by warlords, strong men and patrimonialist 
networks or traditional tribal systems (Reno, Lister & Wilder, 2005; Jackson, 2003). In 
aiming to build states, donors are often keen to expand the control of the central 
government beyond the confines of the capital city. Therefore, the potential ability of 
service provision to act as a non-violent vehicle for territorial penetration is very 
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attractive to international donors aiming to build capable states that have controlling 
presence, authority and visibility throughout their land.  
 
Standardisation is a trickier concept to discuss in this context. It maps on to donor 
aims if you can translate standardisation as being a process that creates equality of 
access to public services; all citizens gain the same level of access to similar 
standards of public services throughout the territory. Conflict inspired by grievance 
over ‘horizontal inequalities’ (see Stewart) is therefore mitigated as no single group is 
enjoying privileged access to basic services. However, the idea that donors engaging 
in service provision are inherently creating a cultural identity is more contentious. In 
some contexts donors might be pleased to assist in the creation of a cultural identity 
that maps onto the governing state rather than identity exclusively being related to 
ethnic identity. However, several authors emphasise that the development of cultural 
identity should be an endogenous process and is not something that external actors 
should seek to meddle with (Etzioni, 2004; Ottaway, 2002). An additional problem is 
that the development community as a whole tends to promote social inclusion and 
embrace cultural diversity rather than express intolerance towards it.   And finally, the 
question remains over what to do in contexts where alternative, non-state, systems of 
service provision already exist (Lister & Wilder, 2005)?  
 
Lastly, how does accommodation via service provision map on to donor ambitions? 
Again, this is highly contentious. Whilst most development donors would be delighted 
with the idea that service provision can be a method of dispute settlement and 
generate political loyalty, the concept of explicitly using service delivery as a political 
tool is extremely contentious. Openly using services as methods of ‘power-brokering’ 
as opposed to the more neutral idea of basing delivery design on principles of equity 
and equality is a highly controversial idea. Donors, historically reluctant to admit to 
the political role they play in the countries in which they work, are unlikely to fully 
embrace the potential role of service provision in facilitating processes of 
accommodation.  
 
 
Lessons for international donors 
 
There are three further findings of our analysis which deserve discussion. These are 
merely stated here as questions that international donors must seriously ask 
themselves when engaging in service provision as a state-building enterprise. 
Donors need to be realistic about the political role that their interventions play. That 
means analysing their role and the way they design programmes from a political 
perspective and embracing that potential, rather than being too afraid to engage in 
discussion over the political aspects of development interventions like service 
delivery. 
 
1. Is efficiency necessarily the best guiding principle for the design of public services 
in fragile states? 
 
This is a highly controversial question. Donors, with their accountability to the tax 
payer, are understandably reluctant to admit that state-building is anything other than 
a straight-forward, technocratic, apolitical undertaking. Unfortunately, in reality the 
opposite is often the case. Obviously, service provision must be efficient enough that 
it does not alienate the population and thereby undermine the legitimacy of the state, 
or provoke conflict amongst different groups (Brinkerhoff, 2005: 5; Jackson & Scott, 
2007). However, the above examples from Western Europe show that there may be 
situations where a political decision could be made to sacrifice efficiency for the 
‘greater good’ of furthering penetration, standardisation or accommodation. An 
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example may be establishing more health centres than strictly necessary in a given 
area in order to raise the visibility of the state there or to pacify an aggrieved group 
who have previously felt excluded from access to basic services. A more 
controversial example would be buying off local elites with jobs in public services in 
order to ensure their loyalty to the nascent state. The early European state building in 
15th and 16th centuries showed a need first to make civil servants loyal to the ruler, 
and only later to make them efficient and impartial (Fischer & Lundgreen, 1975: 457). 
As long as the legitimacy of the state is contested, loyalty needs to be created.  
 
2. Can we really think of state-building as a democratic process?  
 
Much of the state-building process is about coercion and the accommodation of 
certain groups or power factions. Processes of homogenization, standardisation, 
boundary-defining and penetration are unlikely to be universally popular. The building 
of states in Western Europe was costly and involved ‘death, suffering, loss of rights 
and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor’ (Tilly, 1975b: 71). Many were forged 
through blood and iron (Ottaway, 2002: 16). Populations often resisted the creation of 
states. This was visible in tax rebellions, food riots, and resistance against 
conscription (Tilly, 1975b: 71).  
 
The creation of nations required homogenization of certain groups in society, and 
sometimes the destruction of existing power structures. The process was dominated 
by a desire for stability and security, not democracy. A second and related element, 
therefore, is that much of the nation- and state-building was an elite-driven process. 
Nationalist movements appealed to the masses, but they were very often initiated by 
the societal elites. O’Donnell and Schmitter gave pacts between elites a central role 
in transitions from authoritarian rule (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986), and 
consociational arrangements are in a similar way an accommodation between elites 
(Lijphart, 1977). We note Ottoway’s observation that ‘The world should not be fooled 
into thinking that it is possible to build states without coercion’ (Ottaway, 2002: 18). 
Harsh compromises are often necessary, and these include military coercion and the 
recognition that democracy is not always a realistic goal.’ (Ottaway, 2002: 16).  
 
3. Where is the line between nation-building and excessive nationalism? 
 
State- and nation-building and nationalism are very closely related. Nationalism does 
not always have a good name; a stimulation of nationalism combined with political or 
even ethnic accommodation strategies may be difficult or risky. Certain processes 
inherent to state- and nation-building such as socialisation through the school 
system, army, media, or public services; or processes of boundary defining can 
easily slip into forms of extreme nationalism. State- and nation-building may lead to 
the destruction of existing identities and allegiances, and may come at a cost for 
certain groups that are being assimilated. Processes of political socialisation, or the 
instilling of desirable features in the population may be felt as very intrusive and 
invasive (Miguel, 2004: 331). Nationalist approaches to the organisation of public 
services may also lead to the destruction of well-functioning existing public services 
and public goods, to be replaced by national ones, for the sake of it. The right 
balance between public services that function effectively, efficiently, and 
economically, and public services that reflect and propagate a national or a state 
identity may be particularly hard to find. 
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